Introduction
When British Paratroopers shot dead 13 people at a civil rights march in Derry on January 30, 1972 it dealt a hammer blow to British government claims of neutrality and moral authority in dealing with the escalating violence in Northern Ireland.
Critics of the army argued that the killings were a deliberate massacre planned at the highest levels of government. Defenders of the army argued that the killings of civilians were an understandable if regrettable consequence of the confused situation on the ground as the soldiers responded to attacks by the IRA. The latter view was supported by the Widgery Inquiry appointed by the British Government in 1972 to inquire into the events, with the cautionary admonition from British Prime Minister Edward Heath to remember that they were fighting a "propaganda war" as well as a military war in Northern Ireland.
i The Widgery report focused on the actions of soldiers on the ground rather than on the political and military decision-makers. It generally accepted the soldiers' accounts that they had behaved reasonably in the circumstances and went no further in its criticism than to note that the firing of several soldiers 'bordered on the reckless'.
ii Academic and public debate on Bloody Sunday was revived by the establishment of the Saville Inquiry in 1998, established in the context of the Northern Ireland Peace
Process to address long-standing demands by campaigners for a new inquiry. One consequence of the Inquiry is that historians now have access to the kind of material rarely available for the study of a single historical event, including huge volumes of material on the historical context and on the political and military decision-making processes. This article draws on the mass of new material generated by the inquiry, including the monumental synthesis of the evidence provided in the closing statement of counsel to the Inquiry, Christopher Clarke. It provides an alternative interpretation of the political and military decision-making process, challenging key elements in the analysis in the existing literature.
iii By contrast with existing accounts, it argues that the Bloody Sunday operation was a calculated plan devised at a very high level to stage a massive and unprecedented confrontation that would disrupt and shatter an established policy of security force restraint in the city of Derry. It argues further that the operation that day emerged from an intense internal struggle to shape security policy that reflected deep divisions within the security forces, analysing the statements and evidence of key participants much more critically than existing accounts do. It argues that high-level decisionmaking is central to the explanation of the outcome that day. 
Context

Debating Bloody Sunday
Those critical of the military operation on Bloody Sunday have long argued that Bloody Sunday was a calculated massacre. Gerry Adams, President of Sinn Féin, for example, has argued that Bloody Sunday was "…a controlled deliberate exercise, decided and planned in advance at the highest political and military level…."
v But if we characterise Bloody Sunday as a calculated government initiative that proceeded according to plan, it is difficult to explain the abrupt and dramatic reduction in army activity in its wake, the abolition of the Unionist government at Stormont weeks later, and the secret talks between the British government and the IRA a few months afterwards. It stretches credulity to argue that Bloody Sunday was a deliberate repressive prelude to a dramatic softening of the British government's approach.
And it is not entirely convincing to argue that the British government had to adjust its policy after Bloody Sunday only because it miscalculated the strength of public reaction to a planned massacre of civilians. It is clear that some senior British government officials at least were well aware of the negative consequences of such a massacre and immediately regarded it as a 'disaster. vi This is not to say that the killings were regarded in this way by all sections of the state. Nonetheless, the disastrous political consequences of Bloody Sunday forced the British government to adopt a significantly more conciliatory approach in its wake in an attempt to ensure that such an event was not repeated.
In particular, any attempt to argue that these events emerged from a deliberate cabinet policy has to contend with the curious paradox that the British Government made a formal decision to severely constrain army action in Derry only weeks before Bloody Sunday. vii Bew comments on Edward Heath's remarks at a January 11th cabinet meeting that this was not the time to provoke a major confrontation in Derry that "This is not the tone of voice of a prime minister contemplating a Bloody Sunday massacre within three weeks" viii but it doesn't necessarily follow that the Bloody Sunday killings did not originate with high-level decisions. The paradox that a British
Government that had recently decided on a policy of restraint in Derry could then preside over a massacre of civilians is not the end of the mystery but the beginning.
The argument that unexpected events on the day provide the principal explanation for this disjuncture is not adequate. Both Hennessey and Bew's accounts discuss the sense of threat felt by the soldiers on entering the no-go area, and the significance of IRA shooting and alleged shooting on the day. ix In his extensive and detailed discussion of evidence and allegations of IRA shooting, Hennessey stresses the fact that a shot was fired at Paratroopers before they entered the Bogside and that a few shots were fired by a scattered handful of IRA members as the Paratroopers advanced. x In his opening paragraph Bew writes "It has not yet been definitely established who fired the first shot" as though the answer to this question is the key to understanding the killings. xi The implicit suggestion is that the killings by the Paras can be explained to a great degree as a response to IRA shooting and the sense of threat.
The emphasis on the significance of IRA shooting fits with popular analyses that argue that it is impossible for those who were not there to understand how the soldiers felt, and why they must have felt it necessary to react in the way they did. DudleyEdwards, for example, argues that soldiers "in fear of their lives" in "the frightening atmosphere" that day "panicked".
xii Accounts such as these imply that it is unrealistic to judge soldiers by an ideal standard of behaviour that is impossible to maintain in such difficult situations. But it is not necessary to set an ideal standard of behaviour against which to judge the behaviour of the Paratroopers. We can assess their behaviour instead by the working standards established by other soldiers, operating in similar circumstances in the same city over the previous months. In the autumn of 1971 British troops launched repeated night-time raids into the no-go areas in Derry, deep inside the barricades. In the middle of the night they faced large crowds of rioters several hundred strong, were attacked with petrol bombs and blast bombs and came under fire as they carried out search operations. Huge quantities of CS gas were used and hundreds upon hundreds of rubber bullets were fired during these operations. Soldiers also fired live rounds but despite the intense violence and the unpredictable conditions just a few civilians were killed in the course of these raids. xiii The Paratroopers' behaviour on Bloody Sunday didn't just breach an abstract standard set by faraway officials and armchair critics, it marked an abrupt and brutal deviation from the standards established in practice by other British army units in the same city. Given that the Paratroopers were facing circumstances not very different, and in some senses less challenging, than those faced on many occasions by other British soldiers, the level of threat on the day cannot provide the primary explanation as to why so many civilians were killed.
To understand those killings it is necessary to place them in the wider context of an intense and ongoing struggle to shape security policy. Central to understanding the events of the day is the decision-making process by which the Paras came to be deployed in the Bogside that day, and the preferences and intent behind those decisions.
Internal opposition to Operation Forecast
In the years between the 
Repositioning Chief Superintendent Lagan
In the light of the representation of Frank Lagan as a marginal and even unprofessional figure it is important to emphasise the extent to which he was a key driver of security policy in Derry up to and including Bloody Sunday. The local pro-Unionist paper, the Londonderry Sentinel described how an 'almost eerie' calm descended on the city after the agreement went into place and the relentless rioting of the previous seven weeks petered out. xxxi The agreement was followed by a dramatic reduction in levels of violence in the city, but violence began to escalate again within a few weeks. This policy of restraint has been portrayed as a failure, with the implication that it discredited the conciliatory approach associated They were not a success because they created a more intense situation at a time when we were trying to not stir up matters or to harass people.
xlii
The decision to stop the raids was later endorsed at higher levels but originated with
MacLellan. According to MacLellan, when General Ford visited Derry in the days after the last of these raids "the problems" were "…pointed out to him… and he agreed that his directive, which he issued to me when he arrived, should be modified, The reference here to a 'higher' profile than that adopted previously is best interpreted as support for MacLellan's advice to return to restraint, modified slightly to accommodate Ford's urging that they maintain a "much more aggressive policy". The dominant thrust of the policy change was in the direction of restraint and the reference to 'higher' activity did not constitute strong pressure on the local commander to be more aggressive. Ford's appreciation was a contribution to the discussion. It did not have the status of an operational order and therefore did not constitute a set of directions to MacLellan. This policy shift clearly mandated renewed restraint and left detailed decisions in the hand of the local commander on whose initiative this shift had been made.
The post of CLF had been newly created in 1970 to remove the burden of direct operational decision-making from the GOC but it was an awkward division of labour. been a shock to discover that even endorsement at cabinet level was not sufficient to insulate him against demands for more aggressive action from the CLF.
In the same memo General Ford wrote 'I am coming to the conclusion that the minimum force necessary to achieve a restoration of law and order is to shoot selected that by early January the army felt "that that they were losing control over public order in Derry" and "viewed the situation as increasingly intolerable and one which demanded rectification". 
Planning Operation Forecast
In the context of this dissatisfaction with the policy of restraint in Derry the sequence of events around the subsequent planning for the march is suggestive. Frank Lagan met Brigadier MacLellan on the Monday before the civil rights march and proposed that the march be allowed to proceed to its destination in the city centre in order to reduce the risks of violent confrontation. In a message to General Ford that evening
MacLellan described Lagan's view that confrontation around the march would '…shatter such peace as is left in the city; create intense violence and remove last vestiges of moderate goodwill' and stated that 'I agree that consequences of stopping march will be very serious and reckon that my present permanent force levels almost certainly inadequate if we are to face situation Lagan envisages.' lxiv Given that General Ford had recently stated that he was 'disturbed' at the approach of MacLellan and Lagan it seems reasonable to assume that this message added to his sense of disturbance. MacLellan was conveying Lagan's proposal without adding any hint of disagreement.
Hennessey argues that Lagan was isolated in his proposal to allow the march to Senior figures in the security forces who were neither isolated nor peripheral were seeking to minimise confrontation in relation to the march. In direct response to a suggestion to do everything possible to avoid confrontation Ford had decided that the day would be used as an opportunity for an arrest operation on a scale the city had never seen before. It seems that the largest number ever arrested previously during a riot in the city was 23 or 27. That is, it was an operational decision, rather than a policy decision, and therefore within the remit of the CLF. Because the planned arrest operation had been successfully characterised as a responsive operational decision, measures within the security forces to reduce its impact or to prevent it going ahead were manifested in operational decisions justified on technical grounds or in informal pressure rather than in formal opposition to the initiative.
Thus, after the meeting with General Ford, Brigadier MacLellan and his Brigade
Major agreed between themselves that the figure Ford had suggested was impossibly large and that they would not specify a figure in the Operation Order for the day. were an outside battalion brought in but I don't think the RUC and the brigade that were in Londonderry were actually very much on side." lxxviii " [They] were not at all happy about what we were being asked to do. I just felt that there was a pacifist sort of attitude". lxxix In these circumstances it is unsurprising that attempts by MacLellan to restrain the Paras might be treated as fairly inconsequential. General Ford's presence on the ground reinforced the understanding that the operation enjoyed the direct sanction of the CLF, and was in a sense directed against the policy of restraint implemented by local commanders. "That's the trouble with you in Londonderry, you aren't aggressive enough" General Ford commented to a senior local commander after the shootings, when it was clear there had been shooting but before it was clear how many had died. lxxx There seems little doubt that this attitude and understanding, which informed the concept for the operation, had been conveyed to the soldiers on the ground in a variety of ways and provides much of the explanation for the approach they took that day. Given that the local policy of restraint enjoyed direct and recent government sanction, it raises serious questions about the relationship between military and political decision-making in Northern Ireland.
Conclusion
Existing historical accounts of Bloody Sunday treat the killings as the outcome of a more-or-less unified military anxiety at increasing disorder in Derry, combined with unexpected events on the day, presenting the killings as the outcome of essentially responsive actions by the British military. In so doing they lend support to the 'cockup' theory that represents the killings as the outcome of a series of (often understandable) errors of interpretation and communication. They reject the idea that the killings emerged from a high-level plan to carry out a massacre. In so doing they obscure the intensity of the internal struggle to shape security policy in the city, and the extent to which the killings were the outcome of a calculated confrontation planned at a high level and carried out in the face of strong opposition from other elements within the security forces. At the heart of these events is a clearly planned confrontational initiative taken at the highest levels of the military in Northern
Ireland. At the very least, a foreseeable likely consequence of the operation was the killing of civilians. If those involved in devising and implementing this confrontation calculated that they could act as they did with impunity, the Widgery tribunal proved their assumptions correct. The British Government may not have planned and approved a massacre in advance, but they sanctioned it in retrospect, even if it prompted them to shift to a much less repressive approach.
The initiative to launch a major arrest operation by 1 Para on the day of a civil rights march in Derry emerged at the intersection between two opposing tendencies within the security forces, each of them able to claim a mandate for their approach from different government policy decisions, still locked in struggle in the last minutes before the Paras moved forward into the Bogside. Ironically, Operation Forecast fulfilled the worst predictions of those who had sought to restrain security force activity and provided an example of the damaging consequences of a tougher approach. In the short term it shifted the balance decisively away from the advocates of increased repression, although the pendulum would swing back again. It illustrates the way in which policy divisions at the highest level were reflected in struggles to shape the implementation of policy on the ground through the operational decisionmaking of the security forces. The disjuncture between this confrontational plan and the prior British government decision to restrain action in Derry raises serious questions about the relationship between policy-making and operational decisionmaking by the military in Northern Ireland, illustrating how a significant policy initiative could be effected through an ostensibly responsive operational decision.
